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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Ronald Vaughn contends the district court erred when it decided his statements made
prior to receiving Miranda1 warnings were admissible during his jury trial.  A reasonable person
in Mr. Vaughn’s situation would not have felt free to leave the extended traffic stop on the side
of a freeway with one of the three uniformed officers standing over him while the other two
searched his car with a drug dog.  Therefore, Mr. Vaughn’s freedom was curtailed to the degree
associated with a formal arrest, and thus, he was “in custody” for Miranda purposes.  As such,
this Court should reverse the decision to admit those unwarned statements, vacate the judgment
of conviction, and remand this case for further proceedings.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
As part of an ongoing drug investigation, officers saw Mr. Vaughn travel to Salt Lake
City.2  (Tr., p.48, L.6 - p.49, L.6.)  They suspected he had gone there to purchase drugs.
(Tr., p.47, L.11 - p.48, L.5.)  As a result, they planned to stop and arrest him as he returned to
Boise.  (Tr., p.49, L.24 - p.50, L.13, p.53, Ls.21-25.)  To effectuate that, they conducted what the
prosecutor described as a pretext stop on his car.  (Tr., p.62, Ls.7-10; see also Tr., p.51, Ls.4-11
(the officer describing the nature of that stop).)  The traffic stop occurred on I-84 on the outskirts
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 The officers had attached a GPS device to Mr. Vaughn’s car pursuant to a federal search
warrant.  (See Grand Jury Tr., p.19, Ls.15 - p.20, L.7.)  The district court took judicial notice of
the transcript from the grand jury proceedings, as well as the application and order for that
warrant (see Sealed Exhibit (“Vaughn 45104 sealed.pdf”)), during the hearing on Mr. Vaughn’s
motion to suppress the evidence due to the officers abandoning the purpose of the stop.
(Tr., p.24, Ls.15-17.)
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of Boise in the late afternoon or early evening hours.  (See Tr., p.49, Ls.11-22; Grand Jury
Tr., p.24, Ls.18-19.)
Three uniformed officers responded to the immediate traffic stop in three different
marked vehicles.  (See Grand Jury Tr., p.25, Ls.4-13; Tr., p.51, Ls.4-11.)  One of those officers
had a police dog with him.  (Grand Jury Tr., p.25, Ls.10-13.)  Another plain-clothes officer and a
federal  agent  oversaw  the  traffic  stop  from  a  short  distance  away.   (Grand  Jury  Tr.,  p.24,
L.18 - p.25, L.3; see Grand Jury Tr., p.22, Ls.3-5; Tr., p.51, Ls.22-23.)  There were other
undercover officers in unmarked police cars who had been part of the surveillance team which
had followed Mr. Vaughn from Jerome, at least one of whom was also in the area of the traffic
stop.  (See Tr., p.52, Ls.2-16.)
During the traffic stop, officers had Mr. Vaughn get out of his car and sit on the guardrail
on the side of the freeway.  (Grand Jury Tr., p.25, Ls.7-9.)  One of the officers stood by him the
entire time.  (Tr., p.10, Ls.1-3.)  The other two officers and the dog proceeded to search his car.
(Grand Jury Tr., p.27, L.18 - p.28, L.13.)  During that time, Mr. Vaughn responded to officers’
questions, making several incriminating statements, which included admitting to using
methamphetamine earlier that day.  (See, e.g., Tr., p.88, Ls.2-18 (the prosecutor describing those
comments while arguing her notice of intent to present evidence under I.R.E. 404(b).)  The
prosecutor admitted Mr. Vaughn had not been informed of his rights at any point during the
roadside questioning.  (Tr., p.95, Ls.23-25.)  Based on the evidence the officers found in
searching Mr. Vaughn’s car, the State charged Mr. Vaughn with trafficking heroin, possessing
methamphetamine, and possessing drug paraphernalia.  (R., pp.9-11, 18-19.)
Mr. Vaughn moved to suppress the evidence found during the searches of his car based
on the fact that officers had immediately abandoned the initial purpose of the stop to conduct the
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initial  search  of  his  car.   (R.,  pp.47-52  (asserting,  for  example,  that  none  of  the  officers  were
preparing traffic citation during the dog sniff).)  After a hearing on that motion, the district court
denied that motion, finding the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the scope of the
traffic stop based on the information they had gathered during the drug investigation.  (Tr., p.66,
Ls.1-23.)
The State also filed a notice of intent to use evidence under I.R.E. 404(b), specifically,
the information about the drug investigation and Mr. Vaughn’s admissions during a subsequent
interrogation at the police station.3  (R., pp.83-86.)  Mr. Vaughn objected to that notice, moving
to suppress all that evidence as unduly prejudicial or cumulative instead.  (R., pp.93-96)  The
district court did not take up that issue until the day of trial.  (See generally Tr., p.75,
L.15 - p.105, L.3.)
While arguing that issue, the prosecutor asserted that Mr. Vaughn’s statements made on
the side of the freeway should also be considered admissible as evidence of his knowledge and
intent.  (Tr., p.87, L.15 - p.89, L.20.)  Defense counsel responded that Mr. Vaughn had just told
him that he had not been informed of his rights before making the roadside statements.
(Tr., p.90, Ls.17-20.)  Defense counsel conceded that he had been provided recordings of the
traffic stop some months prior.  (See Tr., p.97, L.24.)  Nevertheless, defense counsel argued that
the roadside statements should not be admitted because Mr. Vaughn was in custody at the time
he made those unwarned statements and introducing them would be unduly prejudicial.
(Tr., p.90, L.25 - p.21, L.9.)  Although the State argued Mr. Vaughn’s arguments in that respect
should be procedurally barred under I.C.R. 12 (Tr., p.97, Ls.7-14), the district court ruled on the
3 Mr. Vaughn was read his Miranda rights prior to that subsequent interrogation at the police
station.  (Grand Jury Tr., p.34, L.17 - p.35, L.10.)
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merits of Mr. Vaughn’s motion, concluding there was no Miranda violation because Mr. Vaughn
was not in custody when he made those statements.  (Tr., p.98, Ls.6-11.)
The prosecutor ultimately presented the roadside statements during Mr. Vaughn’s trial.
(See, e.g., State’s Exhibit 27.)  During her closing arguments to the jury, she argued that those
statements helped show Mr. Vaughn’s guilt.  (Tr., p.525, Ls.14-24, p.529, Ls.16-19.)  The jury
convicted Mr. Vaughn on all counts.  (R., p.165.)
The district court imposed an aggregate twenty-year sentence on Mr. Vaughn, consisting
of a twenty-year sentence, with ten years fixed, for the trafficking charge, a concurrent seven-
year sentence, with three years fixed, on the possession charge, and a concurrent one-hundred-
eighty-day sentence on the paraphernalia charge.  (R., pp.167-68.)  Mr. Vaughn filed a notice of
appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.177-79.)
5
ISSUE
Whether the district court erred when it concluded Mr. Vaughn was not in custody for Miranda
purposes during the pretext traffic stop.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Concluded Mr. Vaughn Was Not In Custody For Miranda
Purposes During The Pretext Traffic Stop
A. Standard Of Review
The standard of review in regard to a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence is
bifurcated. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 159 Idaho 15, 18-19, 23-24 (Ct. App. 2015).  The appellate
court defers to the district court’s findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence,
but reviews the district court’s conclusions of law de novo. Id.
B. A  Reasonable  Person  In  Mr.  Vaughn’s  Situation  Would  Not  Have  Felt  Free  To  Leave
During The Extended Detention On The Side Of A Freeway, Which Means He Was “In
Custody” For Miranda Purposes
Although this issue came to light through the State’s notice of intent to present evidence
under I.R.E. 404(b), and not Mr. Vaughn’s initial, timely motion to suppress, Mr. Vaughn did
move to suppress the roadside statements as part of his response to State’s notice.  (See
R., pp.93-96; Tr., p.90, L.25 - p.21, L.19.)  Additionally, the district court ruled on the merits of
Mr. Vaughn’s motion in that regard.  (Tr., p.98, Ls.6-11.)  In so doing, it implicitly rejected the
State’s challenge to that argument under I.C.R. 12. Cf. State v. Middleton, 114 Idaho 377, 380
(Ct. App. 1988) (looking to the implicit findings of the district court in a situation where neither
party requested findings of fact under I.C.R. 12(d)).  Therefore, this Court has authority to
review the  propriety  of  the  district  court’s  ruling  on  the  merits  of  Mr.  Vaughn’s  motion. See,
e.g., State v. Beck, 157 Idaho 402, 405 (Ct. App. 2014) (considering the propriety of implicit
findings on a motion to suppress); see also State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998) (holding
the appellate courts have authority to rule on issues directly addressed by the district court).
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Under the Fifth Amendment, statements made during a custodial interrogation are not
admissible unless the defendant has been properly informed of his rights prior to making the
statements. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.  A defendant is “in custody” for Miranda purposes
when his “freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.”
State v. Hamlin, 156 Idaho 307, 313 (Ct. App. 2014); accord Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 439-40 (1984).  That determination is made by evaluating how a reasonable person in the
suspect’s position would have understood his or her situation. Hamlin, 156 Idaho at 313.
Relevant factors include the location and time of the stop, the length of the interview, the nature
and tone of the questioning, whether the defendant was there voluntarily, and the demeanor of
the people involved. Id.  As a result, “‘if a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic
stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes, he
will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.’” State v. James, 148
Idaho 574, 577 (2010) (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 421).
For example, in State v. Myers, unusual or extensive police efforts during a traffic stop
indicated the defendant was “in custody” for Miranda purposes. State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608,
610-11 (Ct. App. 1990).  Specifically, in that case, several officers responded to the initial traffic
stop, they all remained on the scene, and their questions went specifically to a drug investigation.
Id. at 611-12; compare Smith, 159 Idaho at 18-19, 23-24 (concluding the defendant was not “in
custody” for Miranda purposes when a lone officer asked the defendant about the drugs he had
while frisking the defendant).
Like in Myers, there was unusual or excessive police force in and around the traffic stop
of Mr. Vaughn. Three uniformed officers in three separate marked police cars responded to the
immediate traffic stop and remained on scene.  (Grand Jury Tr., p.25, Ls.4-13; Tr., p.51,
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Ls.4-11.)  Another plain-clothes officer and a federal agent oversaw the stop from a short
distance away.  (Grand Jury Tr., p.22, Ls.3-5; p.24, L.18 - p.25, L.3; Tr., p.51, Ls.22-23.)  At
least one other undercover officer who had been involved in the moving surveillance team that
had  been  following  Mr.  Vaughn  for  several  hours  was  also  likely  nearby.   (See Tr., p.52,
Ls.2-16.)  As such, there were at least five, if not more, officers in and around the traffic stop in
this case.
Furthermore, one of the uniformed officers stood next to Mr. Vaughn throughout the
encounter.  (Tr., p.10, Ls.1-3.)  The officers also never returned his identification or registration
information.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.5-7.)  In fact, the officers immediately abandoned the initial purpose
for the stop, extending the detention to pursue the drug investigation instead.  (See Grand Jury
Tr., p.27, Ls.1-21.)  As a result, the two other officers and a police dog were engaged in
searching his car.  (See Grand Jury  Tr.,  p.28,  Ls.7-13.)   That  search  occurred  on  the  side  of  a
freeway on the outskirts of Boise, such that Mr. Vaughn could not have safely walked away from
the stop.  (See Tr., p.55, Ls.9-20 (one of the officers testifying these safety concerns led them to
take Mr. Vaughn’s car to another location before conducting a more thorough search of the car).)
Given the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Vaughn’s freedom of movement was
restricted in the way associated with a formal arrest, such that a reasonable person in that
situation would not have felt free to leave.  As such, Mr. Vaughn was “in custody” for purposes
of Miranda.  Since the prosecutor conceded that Mr. Vaughn had not been read his rights on the
roadside (Tr., p.95, Ls.23-25), the district court erroneously held that those unwarned statements
were admissible during his trial.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Vaughn respectfully requests this Court reverse the order admitting his un-
Mirandized statements, vacate his conviction and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 18th day of December, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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